REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST INTERNA-TIONALISM: RANK-AND-FILE REACTION IN THE USPD*
Historical accounts of the First, Second and Third Internationals, i.e., those organizations that attempted to realize some sort of supranational working-class solidarity, have traditionally been presented in terms of congresses, programs and personalities. Invariably scholars have focused on the public and private debates at this or that international meeting and/or how Marx, Engels, Lenin or some other leading figure influenced or reacted to some specific development. In short, the history of the International has been looked at almost exclusively from the "top down". There is not anything wrong with this approach per se, but it might be of some value to consider, occasionally at least, the people whom the various Internationals were supposed to be serving, in other words to examine the International not only from the "top down" but also from the "bottom up". "Workers of the World, unite!" -what did this slogan, the classic expression of Marxist Socialist internationalism, actually mean to the politically organized working classes? Was Socialist internationalism anything more than a kind of diplomacy carried on between different labor organizations, something which was confined to a particular party secretary, the equivalent of a bourgeois foreign minister? Was Marxist internationalism a matter that was limited to international congresses, gatherings at which the intellectual and bureaucratic elite of political labor met to haggle over high-minded statements of non-existent proletarian solidarity? More specifically, did the concept of Socialist internationalism mean anything to the workers of Europe after August 1914, if indeed it had ever meant much more than a catchy tune one sang when slightly inebriated? The helplessness of the International in the face of the European catastrophe known as the "Great War" certainly seemed to demonstrate that the skeptics had been right, that nationalism rather than internationalism had by far the greater hold on the working classes. On the other hand, the war and the revolutions it spawned gave rise to a rethinking and eventually a rebirth of Marxist internationalism among large segments of European labor, both leaders and the rank and file. Perhaps nowhere was this renaissance of Socialist internationalism more pronounced than in Germany. Not surprisingly, however, scholarly considerations of this phenomenon have tended to have a common methodological denominator; they approach the subject from the "top down". 1 This essay seeks to redress this imbalance. Focusing on the supporters of the internationalist anti-war movement that eventually grew into what for a time was the second-largest political organization in the early Weimar Republic, namely the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD), it examines the manifestations of revolutionary Socialist internationalism at the grass-roots level in Germany.
Why the USPD? To begin with, this particular party liked to think of itself as the true heir to the internationalist heritage of the old Social Democratic Party in the pre-war International. 2 In keeping with this orientation, Independent Social Democrats were involved in every major attempt to resurrect the old International or create a new one either during or after the war -a record no other labor organization could match. 3 Moreover, the party's demise in 1920 was 1 See, for example, Franz Borkenau's classic The Communist International, republished as World Communism (Ann Arbor, 1962) , and the recent studies of James W. Hulse, The Forming of the Communist International (Stanford, 1964) , Julius Braunthal, History of the International (New York, 1967) , Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern (Stanford, 1972) , and Albert S. Lindemann, The 'Red Years': European Socialism versus Bolshevism, 1919 -1921 (Berkeley, 1974 . 2 Protokoll iiber die Verhandlungen des Griindungs-Parteitags der USPD vom 6. bis 8. April 1917 in Gotha, ed. by Emil Eichhorn (Berlin, 1921 Eugen Prager, Geschichte der USPD (Berlin, 1921) , pp. 143-51. For the pre-war or Socialist (Second) International, which was founded in 1889 thirteen years after the dissolution of the Marxist International Workingmen's Association (the First International), see Braunthal, History of the International, I, pp. 195ff.; Merle Fainsod, International Socialism and the World War, 2nd ed. (Garden City, 1969), pp. 11-31; James Joll, The Second International 1889 -1914 (New York, 1966 ; and Georges Haupt, Socialism and the Great War (New York, 1972 1 Finally, the Independent Social Democratic Party had a mass appeal. Prior to its breakup the USPD had moved to within a few percentage points of the Social Democrats' electoral strength (the SPD was the largest party in the Reichstag), was rapidly nearing the one-million level in enrolled members, and appeared to be the most dynamic force in German politics. 2 In fact the USPD presented a radical alternative to the SPD that the German Communists, despite over a decade of trying, were never able to match. Internationals. For a detailed analysis of the Independent Social Democrats' role in these developments see Robert F. Wheeler, USPD und Internationale. Sozialistischer Internationalismus in der Zeit der Revolution (Berlin, 1975) . David Morgan, The Socialist Left and the German Revolution. A History of the German Independent Social Democratic Party, 1917 -1922 (Ithaca, 1975 3 Prior to the fusion of the pro-Moscow Independent Social Democrats and the Communists in December 1920, the German Communist Party was little more than a sectarian splinter group. In the 1920 Reichstag elections it had polled 1.7% of the vote, and as of July 1 it had only 66,323 members. Immediately following the influx of Independents in the winter of 1920-21 the Communists claimed a membership of c. 450,000, but within six months this had dropped to c. 160,000 paying members, and throughout the Weimar Republic the number of enrolled Communists generally fluctuated around 200,000. The Significant as all these factors are, perhaps the most important yet possibly the least obvious reason for using this organization as a casestudy was its highly decentralized structure. Up until it split in October 1920, the USPD organization placed a premium on local initiative, something that was, for example, reflected in its largely autonomous local press. 1 An analysis of some sixty extant Independent Social Democratic publications, combined with the examination of more traditional archival sources, particularly the records of the political police, not only suggests a fairly widespread concern with international questions among supporters of the USPD, but also that this local involvement came to be an important and even determining factor in shaping party policy, often against the will of the national leadership. In this context generational, regional, sex and socio-economic differences are discernable among the Independent membership and certain patterns emerge. Conceivably this information may prove useful not only to a better understanding of Marxist internationalism, but also to a more sophisticated analysis of the international working classes. Thus this essay is both a response to Georges Haupt's call for fresh methodological approaches in dealing with the International 2 and a tentative attempt to fill the need Peter N. Stearns has articulated for considering grass-roots sentiment as well as formal ideas and leadership attitudes in examining labor history. 3 To measure grass-roots opinion in pre-Gallup-poll days is always a difficult task, to discern internationalist attitudes among the rank best the Communists ever did at the polls nationally was 16.9% of the vote in the Reichstag election of November 1932. Generally, however, their electoral support fluctuated around the 12% mark, e.g., 1924 (I) -12.6%; 1924 (II) -9. 0%; 1928 -10.6%; 1930 -13.1%; 1932 (I) -14.3%; and 1932 (II) 1918 -1933 (New Haven, 1964 Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy, 1905 -1917 (Cambridge, 1955 1890 -1914 (Itasca, 111., 1971 and file during wartime especially so. Not only were newspapers under military censorship and political meetings severely restricted as to what might be discussed, but anything that even vaguely resembled Socialist internationalism was considered subversive.
1 Still these very restrictions and controls occasionally provide material for examining and estimating such sentiment.
Early in the war Karl Liebknecht, the radical German Social Democrat, suggested a convenient definition for the tasks of the international Socialist; according to Liebknecht, "Each Socialist Party has its enemy, the common enemy of the International, in its own country. There it has to fight it."
2 The international Socialist must not be distracted by what is going on abroad, but direct his energies to confronting the forces of militarism and nationalism in his or her own country. Later this was reduced to a convenient slogan, "The main enemy is at home" ("Der Hauptfeind steht im eigenen Land"). 3 Yet to speak out publicly against the government, by either the spoken or written word, to say nothing of distributing anti-war manifestos whether they originated locally or at an international meeting in Switzerland, could, and often did, bring a stiff jail term. Liebknecht himself was a case in point, and various other well-known Social Democrats such as Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Ernst Meyer and Clara Zetkin were also arrested for their "subversive" activities. 4 They were not unique in this regard. Besides such prominent and outspoken opponents of the war and the Burgfrieden, the names of numerous lesser-known activists adorn the police blotters of Germany, attesting to the severity of government repression and the difficulty of practicing Socialist internationalism. 5 One way then to measure 1 Under the Prussian Law of Siege, which was implemented at the outset of the war, "Germany was turned into a group of dictatorships". See Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Industry and Labor in Germany 1914 -1918 (Princeton, 1966 Berlin, 1959 ), I, pp. 371, 464, 511-12, 514, 644-45, 679-81, and II, pp. 957, 975, 1038 -40, 1117 -20, 1169 -72, 1278 , 1311 , 1349 At first, it must be admitted, the number of strikers was not all that much greater than those jailed for opposing the government. Not until the war was nearly two years old did a major strike action take place. On June 28, 1916, 55,000 Berlin workers along with smaller numbers of strikers in Bremen, Brunswick, Essen and Stuttgart walked out in protest over Liebknecht's sentencing by a military court.
1 Much more impressive numerically was the metal-workers' strike which broke out on April 16, 1917, and has generally been related to the reduction of the bread ration, i.e., to an economic factor. -98, and Oberreichsanwalt C 48/16-49/16, 53/16-57/16, 62/16 68/16, 92/17, 143/17, 162/17, 20/18, 24/18-29/18, 37/18, 87/18-88/18, 120/18, and J 279/16, 293/16, 329/16, 371/16, 377/16, 575/16, 300/17, 52/18, 146/18, 206/18, 818/18, 829/18; Historisches Staatsarchiv, Leipzig, Polizeiprasidium, Nos 367, 1862 , 1867 , 1970 , 2317 In reality this strike, which involved a quarter of a million munitionsworkers in five major German cities, was directly related to the formation over Easter 1917 of the Independent Social Democratic Party. The platform adopted by the USPD at its founding congress has been superficially described by George Lichtheim as a "return to oldstyle internationalism"; nothing could be more misleading. Lichtheim ignores not only the atmosphere of government repression which severely restricted platform language, but also the commitment of large segments of the party rank and file to the "International of Action" (Internationale der Tat) inspired by Liebknecht. 2 The best support for this latter contention comes from the fact that the April 16 strike was organized by lower-echelon trade unionists in the Metal Workers' Union during the USPD founding congress, and carried out a little more than a week later against the opposition of most of the trade-union hierarchy. 3 The Independent activists clearly used the economic issue to get the workers out, but everywhere they sought to give the strike a political coloring. 4 In Leipzig, where they were in the majority, they secured the adoption of a list of their political demands. These included a demand for peace without annexations and a call to free all political prisoners.
8 (It has also been claimed that during this strike a soviet was formed, suggesting the influence of the Russian February Revolution, although this has been challenged.
1
) What is undeniable is that the Leipzig demands served as a model for demands which militant Independents placed before strikers in other German cities. In Berlin, for example, a large minority continued the strike under these demands after the trade-union leadership had coerced the majority back to work.
2 One "old-style internationalist", USPD chairman Hugo Haase, astutely observed in analyzing the April action that "the question of bread disappeared more and more behind the question of peace". 3 If the political aspect of the April strike is commonly ignored, it is the explicitly international dimension of the next major strike action that is generally overlooked. Nine months and one more Russian "Revolution" later another manifestation of direct action occurred. During the week of January 28, 1918, one million German workers left their jobs in a demonstration strike for peace that Haase, not one given to overstatement, described as the "greatest event in the history of the German working class". 4 Organized throughout the country by the Independents and their allies in the metal trades, the strike had a clearly political and international orientation from the outset. The hardships of the fourth winter of the war were certainly exploited to the fullest in getting the men and women to leave the factories and demonstrate in the streets. 5 2 Not only did the German action follow immediately upon the heels of widespread strikes in Austria-Hungary, but during the mass action the leading USPD newspapers emphasized protest strikes and demonstrations in other countries. 3 In addition, Independent Social Democrats in a variety of locations struck in the belief that they were part of a larger international action, involving international Socialists in the West as well. 4 Like the work stoppages of the previous April, the January strike was not outwardly successful. But what it did help to develop was a consciousness of the need for direct action among USPD supporters, something which was repaid in full in November. While the Independent Social Democrats did not formally prepare the German Revolution as they had the mass strikes of April 1917 and January 1918, 1 More important, following the parliamentarization of the government in October the USPD agitated openly for a German Socialist Republic as its "international duty". 2 If it would be incorrect to suggest that the November Revolution was planned as an international action, the largely spontaneous or grass-roots nature of the Revolution was clearly influenced by internationalist anti-war agitation. Significantly one of the first actions of the revolutionary general assembly of the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Councils was to demand, at the suggestion of the USPD, the restoration of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. 3 That this was sabotaged at a higher level was not the fault of the rank and file. 4 The November Revolution was also followed by fraternization with British, French and Russian prisoners of war in Germany and the attempt via radio broadcasts to the armies on the Western front to spread world revolution to France and Britain. 5 4 Foieign Secretary Solf and the Army command on the Eastern front (both holdovers from the old regime) were opposed to any resumption of diplomatic ties with Soviet Russia, as were the three Social Democratic members of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. That the majority of Independents in the government did not push harder for recognition and even on occasion went along with their Social Democratic colleagues was probably related to three factors: 1) the victorious Allies would not have tolerated the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two major "revolutionary" nations in Europe; 2) the influence of Karl Kautsky, who was openly skeptical of the Bolsheviks' potential for survival; 3) the ill-advised actions of the Soviet government itself such as allowing the German diplomatic missions to be occupied by After the war the question became how to give organizational form to such revolutionary Socialist internationalism. Where was the militant activist international body that would prevent future wars, safeguard the changes that had been won, and work for the victory of world revolution? It certainly does not seem that the majority of Independent Social Democrats envisaged the Second International, either in its old or in some reconstructed form, as embodying this "International of Action". 1 Yet certain "old-style internationalists", i.e., those who maintained the general adequacy of the pre-war International in the party leadership felt otherwise and continued to urge participation in the Second International. For more than nine months they sought, unsuccessfully, to convince the USPD membership of the wisdom of their ways. Under increasing pressure from the local party organizations, which continually objected to the "socialpatriotic" character of the old International, particularly the SPD's role in it, the leadership took an increasingly radical stance at international conferences, but to no avail. They succeeded neither in changing the old International nor in satisfying the rank and file.
Nothing probably did more to deepen grass-roots antipathy towards the Second International than the fiasco that took place on July 21, 1919. On that day, as Arno Mayer has demonstrated, the old International attempted to realize a concerted international action to protest the Versailles treaty and the intervention in Soviet Russia. 2 Its aim was to restore its own credibility and by so doing persuade those parties that had left the Second Internatonal to return to the fold. Its efforts were crowned with failure. The pillars of the resurrected International, the French and British labor movements, failed to participate, while the SPD publicly opposed any action in Germany. The USPD leadership, by contrast, at the apparent insistence of the membership endorsed the action, but left the particular form the demonstrations were to take to the discretion of the local organizations.
Although overlooked by Mayer, the response of the Independent rank and file was quite impressive. On July 21 the Independents succeeded in organizing some form of demonstration strike in a majority of German cities with a population of more than 100,000 as well as in many of the smaller industrial cities of central Germany. In other areas rallies were held after work to demonstrate international solidarity.
1 Only in Italy, Norway and Austria was the response as good or better. 2 That the Italians and Norwegians had left the Second International and were in the process of joining the new Third or Communist International, while the Austrians, like the Independents, were an isolated minority within the old body, was not lost upon the USPD rank and file.
If July 21 demonstrated, as one local paper put it, that the Second International was "incapable of action", 3 the decision of this organization at its next conference to reject various USPD proposals for the radicalization of the International proved beyond a doubt to the vast majority of Independent Social Democrats that the old International was also against the "dictatorship of the proletariat", i.e., against revolutionary Socialism. 4 The murmurings against participating in the Second International which had been observable locally for some time now became a roar. While a few foolhardy souls still advocated the party's continued presence in the old International for one tactical reason or the other, they could generally count on little rank-and-file support. The membership had already forced the leadership to call a special congress for November to decide the International question. 5 The problem that the rank and file was now considering in some detail was what should be done once the party had left the Second International.
Parallel with the grass-roots movement for a total break with the old International, a demand had grown up for some sort of co-operation with the recently established Communist International. Within a few months of its formation in March there had been indications of rank-and-file interest in this body;
1 by the fall of 1919 this had turned into a veritable groundswell for Moscow. During September and October, for example, all of the subdistricts in the strong Halle organization voted overwhelmingly for affiliation to the Third International. 2 Two of the three Greater Berlin districts also called for union with Moscow, and the Lower Rhineland and Western Westphalia organizations, the party's two most important western districts, along with a host of other districts throughout the country, did likewise. 3 As one opponent of the Third International was forced to concede: "nearly everywhere where the comrades have taken a position on the International they have opted for Moscow." 4 It would be wrong, however, to suggest that everyone had hopped aboard the Third International bandwagon. One pro-Comintern journal noted the existence of an "imposing minority" that opposed affiliation. 5 In Greater Leipzig, after Halle the party's strongest organization, a referendum overturned an earlier endorsement of the Third International by a general assembly of the district members.
lateral affiliation with Moscow, as did a variety of smaller party groups.
1 Still the critics of the Communist International tended to differ markedly on what the USPD should do. A close look at this segment of rank-and-file sentiment indicates a remarkable diversity of opinion as to how a truly revolutionary Socialist International should be realized. 2 The supporters of Moscow were not plagued by such doubts, When the Independents' special congress finally convened in late November at Leipzig a clear majority of the participants, many of them relatively young, supported immediate union with the Communist International. have delayed the inevitable.
1 While endorsing the basic principles of the Third International, it called for negotiations towards the merger of all "social-revolutionary" parties and the Third International. The congress majority, however, not only succeeded in amending this to require union with Moscow should negotiations fail, it also succeeded in electing a pro-Comintern majority to the party leadership.
2 Under these circumstances, it was only a matter of time before the leadership, urged on by a restive rank and file, sent a delegation to Moscow to secure an understanding with the Comintern. 3 Yet the four Independent Social Democratic leaders who departed for Russia in early July of 1920 seeking the "International of Action" returned in late August with a list of Twenty-one Conditions for admission to the Communist International, in brief a program for the Bolshevization of the radical European Left.
4 "Lenin's Diktat", as the conditions were commonly referred to in the USPD press, served only to destroy the consensus growing among most Independent Social Democrats since the Leipzig congress that the Third International was potentially the answer to the search for a revolutionary Marxist International. 6 helped destroy the USPD, which may have been its shortsighted goal.
Although there had been a good deal of public discussion about the International within the party ever since the Revolution, the promulgation of the Twenty-one Conditions sparked a debate without parallel in the brief history of the USPD, and possibly in the history of the German labor movement. This "great debate" took place at three levels: in the press, at the national conference of party functionaries in September, and at hundreds of local membership meetings. Interestingly enough there were few Independents at any level who seemed terribly happy about the conditions. While there were some on the left who praised them, and not a few on the right who secretly welcomed them while publicly denouncing them, the majority of Independents seem to have fallen into one of three categories: the apologists, i.e., those who swallowed their pride and to a greater or lesser extent rationalized the need for acceptance; the revisionists, who wanted to try to modify the conditions; the disillusioned, who rejected the conditions and in effect the Third International. This last group and those to their right dominated the first wave of response; by the beginning of September, nineteen USPD papers had already editorialized against the conditions, compared to the mere seven that endorsed them; 1 and a reported two-thirds of those attending the national conference also rejected them. 2 In contrast to the reaction of the functionaries, the response of the local activists, as measured by the hundreds of resolutions adopted at membership meetings, Executive, dated February 5, in The Communist International 1919 -1943 : Documents, ed. by Jane Degras, I (New York, 1956 ), pp. 75-80. Still it was the national leadership that decided to send a delegation to Russia to discuss "merger" terms. was generally positive although there were sometimes marked regional variations.
The issue, however, was not to be resolved by the functionaries or the activists, but rather by the USPD membership voting in a referendum. Only about one of every four Independent Social Democrats (236,333) -apparently a relatively high figure by German tradeunion and labor-movement standards 2 -participated in this election, and by a margin of roughly three to two the rank and file endorsed affiliation under the /conditions. 3 While this was on the average a somewhat lower ratio of support for Moscow than the result of the various membership meetings would have led one to expect, there were still very few areas where a majority actually rejected the conditions and, as the eventual division of the USPD would demonstrate, the referendum results did provide a fairly accurate reflection of rank-andfile sentiment. 4 Why, under the circumstances, this considerable grass-roots support for the Third International? If there is no simple answer to this question, an analysis of the material does suggest a number of possibilities. One thing that even the most cursory reading of the local debates makes apparent is the tremendous sympathy for the Soviet Union prevalent among rank-and-file Independents. This is evident not only in the rhetoric of pro-conditions speakers at such meetings, but even more so in the anti-conditions resolutions, which bent over backwards expressing loyalty and support for the heroic Russian brothers. 5 The Twenty-one Conditions appear to have been of only secondary importance to many, perhaps most, of those who formally voted for them in the local referendum. Much more important in 1 Exceptions to this rule were Saxony, the Brunswick, Magdeburg-Anhalt and Oldenburg-Ostfriesland districts, as well as the Bremen, Gera, Jena, Nordhausen, Upper Franconia and Zeitz subdistricts. 2 See Bremer Arbeiter-Zeitung, October 8, 1920. 3 The only quasi-official primary tally was that given by the supporters of the conditions, namely 144,900 for and 91,000 against acceptance. See Anna Geyer's mimeographed publication Fur Referenten, No 1, October 21, 1920. My own incomplete calculations based on the results published in the USPD press has the vote at 136,685 for and 99,668 against. 4 Out of the twenty-five USPD districts in which a primary was definitely held, the conditions were rejected in only eight. 6 Whereas the resolution submitted to the national congress at Halle calling for acceptance of the conditions contained no mention of the Soviet Union, the resolution opposing acceptance contained a passage expressing "solidarity with Soviet Russia". See USPD, Protokoll iiber die Verhandlungen des ausserordentlichen Parteitages in Halle vom 12. bis 17. Oktober 1920 (Berlin, n.d.), pp. 70-71. determining grass-roots behavior on this issue was the appeal of the Soviet Republic, the Russian Revolution and the Third International, and the hope they provided for those individuals who, believing that their own "revolution" had been betrayed, were becoming more and more alienated from German society.
Significantly, in only a few of the areas where the USPD was an important political force did a sizeable majority of the rank and file support the Twenty-one Conditions; weaker organizations, on the other hand, tended to accept the conditions. 1 This suggests a certain connection between political ineffectiveness and the desire for apocalyptic revolutionary change, since in areas where the Independents were more involved in the established political order the membership tended to be less willing to break with the past in order to qualify for the Comintern panacea.
Another factor which seems to have been related to the variations in the referendum results and may also help to explain why certain centers of USPD strength supported the conditions while others opposed them, was the general industrial structure of the different districts. For example, in all the USPD organizations that served the central German textile region of Northern Bavaria, Western Saxony and Eastern Thuringia, the conditions were roundly defeated.
2 Similarly, the only subsection of the Lower Rhineland organization where the conditions lost was in the West German textile center of Elber- 1 The only districts where the USPD was the dominant labor party and the conditions received a large majority were Halle and the Lower Rhineland. In the latter incomplete returns gave the conditions a 14,999to 5,621 majority; in the former the vote was 25,064 to 8,384. While the advocates of the conditions were victorious in all three districts of the important Greater Berlin area, in each case their margin was very small. This was also the situation in Western Westphalia. By contrast their biggest margins came in areas where the party was relatively weak, such as Hamburg, where the conditions were approved by better than five to one. Wurttemberg, where the ratio was better than four to one, and Hesse-Waldeck, where the margin was nearly ten to one! There were no comparable victories for the opponents of the conditions. The few times the conditions were soundly defeated it was generally in a solid USPD area such as Leipzig, Bremen or Brunswick. This pattern was even discernible regionally. In Bavaria, for example, the only subdistrict in which the USPD was the dominant labor organization, namely Upper Franconia, was also the only area where the conditions were rejected. For a detailed examination of these differences see "Die '21 Bedingungen' und die Spaltung der USPD", loc. cit., pp. 139ff. 2 See Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Volks-, Berufs-und Betriebszahlung vom Juni 1925 . Berufszahlung (Berlin, 1927 No 11, pp. 73, 78; No 30, p. 81 , for the region's economic structure, and Reichsamt fur Arbeitsvermittlung, Jahrbuch der Berufsverbande im Deutschen Reich (Berlin, 1922) , pp. 95, 103, for the unionized textile-workers in this area in 1920.
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1 What the textile industry proved to be for the conditions' opponents, the mining industry was for the advocates. In both the Ruhr and Halle districts, which contained the largest concentrations of mine-workers in Germany, the local rank and file voted overwhelmingly in support of the Comintern decisions. 2 In the case of the metal trades the situation is more complex. While USPD strength was often to be found in metallurgical centers, the type of metal industry in which the workers were engaged appears to have been related to the outcome of the referendum. Thus in the Bergisches Land, i.e., Remscheid and Solingen, where the production of metalwares predominated, the membership endorsed the Twenty-one Conditions overwhelmingly, whereas in neighboring Diisseldorf to the west and Hagen to the east, where the Independent rank and file divided nearly evenly in the referendum, a higher percentage of the working classes were engaged in the refining of metal-producing ores and the production of heavy machinery.
If Independent Social Democratic women were, relatively, among the strongest opponents of acceptance, the more youthful elements of both sexes provided Moscow with its greatest support among the rank and file. This generational difference was brought out vividly in some USPD families where during the "great debate" fathers could be found criticizing the same conditions their sons and daughters were supporting.
1 Already discernable among the party functionaries, the age division came sharply into focus among the delegates elected by the rank and file to attend the national congress that would formally decide the issue. 2 While the mean age of all delegates was 38.4 years, the supporters of affiliation under the Twenty-one Conditions averaged 35.9, compared with a 41.9 mean for the opponents, i.e., a difference between the supporters and the opponents of six years on the average. 3 Conceivably age may well have been the crucial factor in securing a majority for Moscow.
One thing is clear, the split that was formalized at the USPD's Halle congress in October 1920 owed nothing to the four days of rhetorical jousting that took place during this wake, Comintern chairman Zinoviev's claims to the contrary notwithstanding. 4 During these four days three delegates modified their positions, adding up to a net gain of one-half a vote for Moscow. In each case the switches came from individuals who represented the minority position in their district; in each case it would appear that fear of rank-and-file retaliation back home caused the switch. 5 Never again, however, was grass-roots sentiment to exert so strong an influence as it had during the heroic years that marked the flowering of the USPD. In neither the United Communist Party (the result of the fusion of the German Communists and the Independents who supported Moscow) nor in the Rest USPD was rank-and-file opinion to count for very much. Ironically, both parties became characterized by overcentralization and in the process lost much of their support among the working classes. After Halle grass-roots internationalism, on any large scale, was no more. The result of its demise was the end of the short-lived renaissance of Marxist internationalism in Germany. The revolutionary Socialist International -the "International of Action", which had seemed so close to realization -was but a bitter memory of what might have been.
